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NEW RESPONSIBILITIES OF CITIZENSHIP*
Persons living in great formative periods of history rarely are
able to understand the social change that is going on about them.
This fact is shown by contemporaneous literature, and is in ac-
cordance with reason and experience. The perspective of time
is required to enable one to observe and to give due proportion to
the various elements of such movements; and, indeed, some of
the profoundest changes are entirely unperceived or ignored in
their day.
It is quite apparent, however, that in our own time, and espe-
cially within the past five years, a most remarkable turn of social
and political tide has set in. What the extent of the metamorphosis
will be, our generation, perhaps our century, will hardly be able
to answer. It is clear that in the United States there is a decided
tendency toward a popularization of political power, especially the
law making power. This tendency is observable not alone in our
own state, which in some respects has blazed the way for others
to follow, but elsewhere throughout the Union. And concurrently
with this movement, and it may be to some extent because of it,
there is a marked growth of interest in the doctrines of socialism
and philosophic anarchism. The spirit of revolution is abroad,
and it will be for the future historian a fascinating study to dis-
cover the causes, and to examine the scope and consequences of
the impulse. The movement is evidently not confined to the
United States. The fact is that there is a social ferment in va-
rious European countries, not less interesting and not less pro-
found in depth and influence upon political institutions than in
our own country.
In Oregon, extraordinary constitutional changes have already
been adopted. It is more than likely, in view of what has been
that further radical changes will follow. I am not here to de-
nounce at wholesale such changes as ill-advised, or worse. Be it
my duty, rather, to point out some considerations that may have
a bearing on future conduct.
The mouth of the demagogue in these days is full of phrases
about the rights of the common people. He is sure that the
common man is downtrodden and oppressed, and that we should
have a return of the good old days when everybody was on an
equality, and the rich and the powerful could not take advantage
*Suggesting certain limitations on the use of the Initiative and Refer-
enduni.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF CITIZENSHIP
of the humble citizen, and when the people themselves made the
laws. It is assumed, and freely asserted, that popular rights
have been lost, and that there was a time when every one had a
part in the law making. As this latter statement represents a
popular fallacy which is not well grounded upon historical fact,
it may be well, before proceeding, to give this subject some slight
consideration.
Citizens of the United States at the present time are not
only the richest in material wealth, Pnd the most comfortably
housed, and the best fed of those of any country on earth, but
they also enjoy (without reference to the power of direct legis-
lation and direct nomination) greater political power, and have
more individual influence upon public affairs than was enjoyed
by their forbears. I have no sympathy with those misguided
teachers who-stand in the public places and raise their voices in
an effort to divide the pecple into classes, to denounce the rich,
and to excite the envy and hatred of the poor and the ignorant.
They may be heard crying that the rich grow richer, and the
poor grow poorer, and that the laws are made for the corpora-
tion, and the courts sell justice. This talk is not new. It is
as old as history.
I venture to say that complaints against the inequalities of
wealth, and criticisms of courts and public officials for partial-
ity or venality, are made in every civilized country, and in all
periods. I believe that the public men of our time are not a
whit worse than those of earlier days, and I am satisfied that the
pages of history show that the world grows better and not worse.
Abuses there are, but not more vital than the abuses of earlier
days. Reforms are needed, but they may be worked out without
throwing away the experience of history. The aggressions of
wealth and corporate power, the delays and uncertainties of
judicial proceedings and in the punishment of crime, the failure
of legislators to faithfully serve the people, are evils to be sure,
but not greater than the evils that have been coped with by
earlier generations.
The patriotic men who so earnestly sought to frame a federal
government that would best withstand the test of time appre-
ciated the danger from direct popular legislation, and, as the
debates show, agreed with practical unanimity that a democracy
was much less stable, and much more amenable to this cause of
decay than a representative form of government. Among the
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names of those who pointed out the distinction and advocated
the republican form are Hamilton, Madison, Ames, Gerry, Ran-
dolph, Wilson, Marshall, Rutledge, Bowdoin, Pendleton and
Mason, besides many others.
It may surprise some of the modern law givers to learn that
the reasons then urged against direct legislation were that
experience of the past proved that turbulence, passion, partiality,
lack of debate, despotism of majorities, insecurity of personal
and property rights, intrigue of the designing, debauching of
public morals, venality, and destruction of popular government,
would result if the plan adopted should follow the pattern of the
ancient democracies; and the representative plan, with its checks
and safeguards, was considered the greatest invention and most
important achievement of the convention.
Said Hamilton in the Federalist:
"The difference most relied upon between the American and
other republics consists in the principle of representation; which
is the pivot on which the former moves, and which is supposed to
be unknown to the latter, or at least, to the ancient part of them."
And Jefferson said:
"Modern times have * * * discovered the only device by
which the (equal) rights (of man) can be secured, to-wit: gov-
ernment by the people, acting not in person, but by representatives
chosen by themselves. * * *" 2
We will stop a moment, then, to examine the historical basis
of our constitutional and legal rights, as citizens, to assist in the
making of the laws, and to take our share in the duties of govern-
ment. We will find that there is no foundation for the claim that
Americans have been deprived of the right of the direct exercise
of the law making power. On the contrary, the essential differ-
ence between a pure democracy and a representative system of
government, as applied to general legislation, has been preserved
since very remote times.
Early German society was founded primarily upon distinc-
tions in land ownership and in rank. None but the landowners
possessed the right of participation in the popular assemblies,
or to bear arms; there was also a broad distinction between the
free, and the servi, or unfree. In the popular assemblies of those
primitive people, none but the freemen had a voice, and the
supposition that there was among them an equality of privilege
I Federalist, No. 62.
2Jefferson's Works, VII, 319.
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and a universal suffrage, or even a general participation in the
law making function, is founded upon misapprehension and
error. So, when the Teutons invaded Britain, and brought their
institutions with them, the local assemblies were there; the greater
-opular meetings of the parent country were also preserved in
the witangemot and in the folkinoot; but the fundamental distinc-
tions of rank and land proprietorship were also there. None but
the freemen could participate in the ownership of land, or, conse-
quently, in the right to take part in governmental affairs. The
tinfree consisted of different grades, from the slave to the agra-
rian dependents with more or less liberty. In the generations
following the first settlements, the system of feudal tenures was
evolved. The distinction in class still persisted, and became more
and more firmly established.
Neither time nor space permits, within the limits of this paper,
details in these matters of basic history, but it should be kept
clearly in mind that equality before the law, in the sense of
social or political equality, was not a part of the autonomy of
government, either in the remote or later periods of English
history. Notice, too, that whatever the fact may have been with
reference to the Germanic tribes, while they were more or lesi
nomadic and migratory, a people small in numbers and loosely
established, it is clear that in England, almost from the beginning,
the representative system prevailed. For, while the township
assembly was purely democratic and not elective, but consisted of
either free alodial owners, or of dependent agrarians, as the case
might be, the larger assemblies, such as those of the shire or the
kingdom, consisted of elected representatives sent by these lesser
assemblages.
Except in making the local by-laws, therefore, the legislative
powers of the people were, from remote times, in England, exer.
cised by delegates or selectmen. This fact is interesting in noting
that, as centuries slipped away, and gradually the power of
the sovereign increased, and the ancient rights of the people were
encroached upon, until endurance ceased to be a virtue, and then
there was wrested from the king the Great Charters of our liber-
ties, it was not an assembly of all citizens that dealt with the
crown, but a parliament of the "three estates." These estates
were the clergy, the barons, and the commons, but the commons
were represented in parliament by persons chosen by certain
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electors. These electors did not by any means comprise all the
lower classes, they were themselves essentially a privileged class.
One of the great writers on English history says that "thz
House of Lords not only springs out of, it actually is, the ancient
witanagemot;" that is to say, the ancient popular assembly of
landed freemen, in the course of time, had become the hereditary
house of the peers. The earliest form of the commons, or the
third estate in parliament, was by the shire assemblies electing
the knights of the shire, who represented the lesser landowners,
and the commercial interests of the towns. Thus it will be seen
that the common people at large never participated in the great
assemblies or parliaments, even in the early times. The general
laws were not made by assemblages of the people, but by delegates
or representatives, and the delegates were not of the lower order.
It was an assembly of such delegates that formulated the de-
mand upon King John for the charter of liberty, and when he
called the barons together at the historic field of Runnymede,
on the Thames, and there executed the instrument under oath,
this was done in the presence of twenty-five of the number chosen
to represent the whole body. The twenty-five were not from the
lowly people; they were all barons.
It was not until very recent times that there was any approach
to manhood suffrage in England. In the American States, at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution, there were various
restrictions on the right to vote, and it was after the nineteenth
century began that the right to vote became free to all, excepting
the slaves of the South.
My aim is to show that with the recent modifications of the
Oregon Constitution, the people have taken a step that has
brought new and serious responsibilities of citizenship. The
grave question is, how will the people meet the new demands
made upon them? In view of the fact that the representative
system in the republic has been on trial but a century and a
quarter, and that the principle now engrafted upon the Oregon
Constitution, if applied to the ultimate, is utterly subversive of
this essential feature of the American plan, the subject is one of
deep concern.
In 1857, Macauley wrote to an American correspondent:
"I have long been convinced that institutions purely democratic
must, sooner or later, destroy liberty or civilization, or both. In
Europe, where the population is dense, the effect of such institu-
tions would be almost instantaneous. * * * You may think that
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your cotutry enjoys an exemption from these evils. I will frankly
own to you that I am of a very different opinion. Your fate I
believe to be certain, though it is deferred by a physical cause.
* * * I heartily wish you a good deliverance. But my reason
and my wishes arc at war, and I cannot help foreboding the
worst." 3
When the great historian wrote these pessimistic views of ou-
country, Americans had an intense pride in their institutions,
a veneration for the Constitution that almost amounted to fetish
worship, and a confidence in its sufficiency for all purposes (aside
from the questions of slavery and state's rights) that has been
repeatedly commented upon by such interested foreign-born ob-
servers as De Tocqueville, Von Hoist, Munsterberg and Bryce.
Mr. Bryce, perhaps the most sympathetic and admiring of the
foreign writers that have studied our political institutions, gives
as a reason for the probable permanency of the American govern-
ment, the profound attachment of the people for the Constitu-
tion. "The Federal Constitution," he says, "is, to their eyes, an
almost sacred thing, an Ark of the Covenant, whereon no man
may lay rash hands." 4
When the Civil War settled the only apparent cause of discord,
and the new amendments were adopted, there seemed to be a
universal feeling of confidence in the perpetuity of our republic.
It seemed that thereafter, when great questions would arise for
settlement, they would be settled within the Constitution. The
supreme law of the land was a firm foundation, a standard rule
and guide, a safe anchor in any storm.
It has come to pass in these days that the restraints and limi-
tations of the Constitution are no longer respected. On all sides
we hear the Constitution denounced as antiquated and insufficient
for modern needs, and when courts apply it as the test, they are
not infrequently abused in most intemperate language. Now, this
may be popular, but before we allow ourselves to drift too far
it may be well to see our direction and our danger.
The written constitutions of the United States have been well
said to take the place in some degree of the ancient and revered
institutions, customs and usages that in other countries tend
toward stability. Here we have a nation whose citizenship is
made up of many elements. Part of the population is foreign-
born. Some of these persons are from countries where the laws
3 Macauley's Life atd Letters, 11, p. 408-9.
4 2 Bryce, Ant. Conwmonw alth, p. 474.
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and methods of government are radically different from ours;
some of them are unable at first to comprehend our institutions;
and some of them would find it difficult to participate with intel-
ligence in any form of popular government. A considerable
percentage of the native-born citizens, white and black, have little
appreciation of the duties of citizenship. On the other hand.
great fortunes are quickly made, and wealthy men and powerful
business corporations are apt to pay little attention to any curb
that holds them in check. Under these conditions, written constitu-
tions are a great safeguard and protection to the right to enjoy
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Their very rigidity
is a protection from force and power and wealth, on the one side,
and from the tyranny of majorities on the other.
Yet, written constitutions are not inflexible. They do not
always require formal amendment to meet new conditions.
Amendments to such instruments, as a rule, are not readily made,
nor is it desirable that they be readily made. But as customs and
manners and habits of thought change from time to time, so
the application and interpretation of a written constitution changes
to meet new conditions. Not that courts rewrite the instrument,
or interpose new words and phrases, but that with the develop-
ment of the nation the instrument comes to have new applica-
tions. Professor Bryce has said that the Constitution of the
United States has "stood because it has been submitted to a
process of constant, though sometimes scarcely perceptible change,
which has adapted it to the conditions of the new age."
Such modifications, because they are gradual, are not harmful;
but if it comes to pass that the instrument may be amended at will.
or, more serious still, that laws adopted by popular vote need not
conform to the Constitution, the danger in times of public pas-
sion or prejudice is easy to understand.
The popular impulse is often wrong, and even when right it is
apt to swing to the extreme and then be followed by a reaction.
Without restraints, therefore, the laws may become uncertain, or
even tinjust and unreasonable.
It is to the habit of resting with a sense of security under
the law that free governments owe their existence. Without this
general feeling of respect for law and order, change would be
frequent. All admit that the respect for the supreme law of the
land is a great influence for peace and order.
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New conditions require new remedies. But methods, which if
.set in motion, will ultimately destroy the fabric of government,
are not to be used while moderation and reason control.
In Oregon, we now permit the Constitution to be amended at
will. Formerly, it required not only the majority of all of the
electors (meaning the majority of the greatest number participat-
ing in the election) to change the Constitution, but the proposed
amendment was required to be agreed to by a majority of all of
the members elected to each house, in two successive legislative
assemblies; now, a bare majority of those voting on the measure
at any general election is sufficient to carry the proposition,
though but a minority vote on it. Formerly, two years and a
half in time, at the least, and the deliberations of four legislative
groups, besides the vote of the majority of the people, was the
requisite; now, in three months' time, an amendment, perhaps
prepared in a secret manner by a single individual, submitted
practically without opportunity for debate, certainly without op-
portunity for pruning, polishing, or enlarging, and generally not
even read by the voter,. may be adopted by a mere minority of the
electors!
I say that this condition imposes new and grave responsibilities
upon our citizens. Let them beware lest in seeking greater flexi-
bility in the fundamental law of the state, they throw away the
precious heritage of their liberties. Let them remember that it
is by the restrictions of the time-worn instrument that disaster
has more than once been averted; and that the stability of our in-
stitutions is the safeguard of not property alone, but of liberty,
and of life itself.
Fortunately, our people are above the average in intelligence
and respect for personal and property rights. An examination
of the reports of the last census shows that a very large propor-
tion can read and write; we have an excellent school system, and
no very yellow journals. The experiment will be tried in safer
conditions than might be the case elsewhere. But we are a new
people, not bound by historic precedent, or accustomed to conserv-
atism by training or education. We are apt to be led to make
experiments, where to experiment is unsafe.
Aside from the ten amendments in the nature of a bill of
rights adopted at the outset, the United States Constitution has
been amended but five times in i2o years. But at the state elec-
tion, held last June, ten different amendments to the Oregon Con-
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stitution were proposed, and voted upon. There is no'limit, and
it might well have been forty instead of ten. Among the amend-
ments adopted were some that go to the very heart of representa-
tive government, such as proportional representation and the re-
call of public officers; the former being utterly visionary and
impracticable, since it cannot be put into practice, and the latter
being so discouraging to independence of thought and action by
public officers, and so dangerous if captiously exercised upon
the judges of the courts, or the principal executive officers of the
state, that the very fact that these amendments are adopted at the
first opportunity under the new scheme, is one of the most
discouraging signs for the future of this experiment.
Surely, I voice the sentiment of all thinking men when I say
that some safeguard should be provided against the too free
exercise of this new popular power. And if, as was the case
formerly, while an amendment agreed upon by one legislative
assembly was awaiting the action of another legislative assembly,
or of the electors, no additional amendment might be proposed,
then, I say, a similar protection now is the least that could be
demanded, and the law should require that but one amendment
might be considered at any one election. Indeed, I do not go too
far when I assert that as matters stand there is no Constitution;
for it is subject to such flux and change as no longer to be the
mainstay of our government.
Direct legislation obliterates the essential characteristics of rep-
resentative government. It is apparent that if the people vote
directly, the element of deliberation is lost, and that influence that
the minority almost necessarily have in any deliberative body,
tending as it must toward modification and compromise, has no
opportunity for assertion. The theory that majorities rule, is by
no means literally true in representative government. The ma-
jority carries its measures; but after reasonable opportunity for
debate and amendment, its measures are no longer the same. It
is this deliberation and discussion, followed by amendment or
possible defeat, that is essential to sound legislation.
In a recent book on Proportional Representation, by J. IR.
Commons (p. 31) occurs the following:
"In the United States, to-day, not only the original Anglo-
Saxon is admitted to the suffrage, but also millions from antagon-
istic races. Especially is this true of the large cities, where 50
per cent. to 8o per cent. of the voters are foreign born, and the
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children of foreigners. If England is threatened by the widening
of the suffrage, far more is the Republic of America. The great
political questions of to-day are those which grow out of the
citizenship of the manual aborers, the former serfs. * * * These
classes are distributed throughout all districts. They form the
wide foundation structure of every community, upon which the
other classes are built. They compose the majority of the
voters."
De Tocqueville, who published his acute observations upon
American political institutions in 1835, said:
"If ever the free institutions of America are destroyed, that
evil may be attributed to the unlimited authority of the ma-
jority." 5
He pointed out that the tyranny of the majority was not
less to be feared than the tyranny of the despot. His words are
echoed by another learned writer of foreign birth, Professor von
Hoist, who published his Constitutional History of the United
States in 1875, saying:
"* * * The tyranny of majorities may often be placed on a
footing with the tyranny of absolute sovereigns. If, in the former
case, the means of defense are far greater than here, the dangers
on the other hand are more serious, because tyranny comes clothed
in the garb of free institutions." 6
As the right to vote has been given to a much larger propor-
tion of the people since the beginning of the republic, so has the
character of the legislation changed, while the country has grown
older and its social and economic problems have become more
difficult and intricate. The number of laws enacted by the early
legislative assemblies was few, and the subject matter was simple
enough. But now the questions for legislative consideration at
each session are such as require the exercise of the most careful
and intelligent judgment. This is not alone because of the
increase of population, its greater density, or its greater gco-
graphic distribution. These things may have their influence, but
the real cause is found in the great difference in society itself; in
the enormous increase of material wealth, the wider dissemina-
tion of news, the more frequent mail service, the introduction
of labor-saving machinery; the change from simple and com-
paratively plain style of living; the introduction of the rail-
road, steamboat, telegraph, telephone, typewriter, electric light,
automobile, and other inventions and instruments of modern life;
5 Dcrn. in America, p. 273.
6.1 von Hoist, p. 211.
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and last, but not least, to the modification and enlargement of the
functions of corporations as instrumentalities for the transaction
of business.
Manifold, intricate and confusing are the swirling currents
of modem life. To attempt to separate the threads, or to exam-
ine, or even to enumerate, the changing and shifting elements, is
utterly impossible. But the duty of the lawmaker must neces-
sarily be vastly more complex and difficult now than in former
generations; the responsibilities of citizenship are greater; and
the intellectual and moral requirements for the exercise of the
duties and privileges of citizenship are much higher than at any
former period in the world's history.
Here, then, is the problem: Shall it be that with these con-
ditions before us, the safeguards formerly surrounding the process
of making laws shall be entirely withdrawn?
Heretofore, when a law was proposed for enactment, it was
required to pass through two houses of the legislature and be
signed by the governor, and the journals must show each step
in its progress through the assembly. The usual steps in this
-progress were for the bill introduced into either house to be read
twice by title, then to be referred to a committee. Here it was
supposed to be carefully scrutinized and debated. Hearings of
persons interested were had, and such amendments as seemed
-necessary would be recommended by the committee. The report
of the committee being received, it might be accepted or rejected,
and the bill when under consideration for its final passage would
he read in full by sections, and further subjected to discussion and
amendment, and would be recommitted, defeated or passed. Then
the same process must be gone through with in the other house,
and any new amendments would cause its return to the house
from which it originated. And when finally passed by both
houses, and properly enrolled and engrossed and signed by both
presiding officers, it reached the governor's hands for executive
action.
Consider how carefully the Constitution guarded against hasty
and unwise legislation. And yet, with all this, it is a matter
of general knowledge that much of the legislation thus adopted
has been found defective in form, or crudely conceived or ex-
pressed, or unscientific, careless, ill-advised or insueticient.
By the Constitution, many safeguards and checks are pro-
-vided such as the prohibition of the passage of special and local
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laws of certain kinds; the requirement that the title must indicate
the subject matter, and that but one subject shall be legislated
upon in each enactment; the requirement that an amended law
must be set forth in full as amended; and many others that might
be named. How far these provisions and other provisions of the
Constitution apply to legislation adopted by direct vote of the
people, under the initiative system, no man is now prepared to
say, and these questions are for the courts to decide. Certainly,
such laws are not capable of having applied to them the pre-
cautionary clauses regulating preparation and deliberation prior
to passage, as is the case with legislative enactments.
At the recent Oregon state election, besides the ten constitu-
tional questions submitted to vote, nine other subjects of legisla-
tion were voted upon. These measures, with the accompanying
printed arguments, when published by the secretary of state in
pamphlet form prior to the election, in pursuance of the legal
requirement therefor, comprised some 124 pages of closely printed
matter. It would require an intelligent study of this pamphlet to
qualify for vote on these propositions, many of which were of
such character as to totally change fundamental and existing prin-
ciples of state government. I shall not attempt, at this time, to
review these measures and to point out their defects. But a mo-
ment's time may be given by way of illustrating my theme.
One is a law changing the time of holding general elections
in the state; but it is a question how far this may alter numerous
co-related statutes, fixing the time when terms of office begin,
and relating to other subjects of importance.
Another is known as the "Corrupt Practices Act." This law
consists of fifty-five sections and over nine thousand words,
or twenty pages of closely printed matter; its title is such as
to readily secure the vote of any right-minded citizen, and its
sponsors undoubtedly had no other purpose in proposing the
measure than to promote the public welfare. But it goes without
saying that very few voters could or would read and digest the
provisions of a proposed law of such length and complexity, and
it need surprise no one who voted in favor of its adoption if it is
afterward discovered to contain clauses that were not generally
known, and that are more or less lost to sight in its long pages.
This law is highly penal, the punishment for violation of any
provision of the act, the punishment for which is not otherwise
specially provided, being not more than a year in jail, or a
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fine of not more than $5,000, or both; besides which any elector
may contest the right of a person to nomination or office, on the
ground of deliberate, serious and material violation of any of the
provisions of the act, and the candidate whose nomination or
election is annulled and set aside for any offense under the act
may not be elected or appointed to office or position of trust,
honor or emolument for a period of time. Among other offenses
under the act is wearing a political badge or button on election
day. The paying of a person for services on election day, such
as distributing cards, or carrying banners or furnishing vehicles,
seems to be prohibited. The provisions regulating the duties,
and the prohibitions against the doing of various things, are
extremely numerous, covering election expenses and statements
of expenses and affidavits, the failure to file which deprives
the candidate of the right to have his name upon the official bal-
lot; and the expenditures regulated include those of not only the
candidate, but of a descendant, ascendant, brother, sister, uncle,
aunt, nephew, niece, wife, partner, employer, employe,'or fellow
official or fellow employe of a corporation.
Notwithstanding the constitutional provision that all elec-
tions shall be free and equal, the law in effect imposes a duty upon
candidates for nomination to pay from one hundred down to ten
dollars, depending on the name of the office, for a page of space
in a publication to be printed by authority, and those who have
any money left may purchase additional space at the rate of $ioo
per page, no payment to be less than for one page, and not more
than three additional pages to be allowed any one candidate.
Opponents are also permitted space in this pamphlet to argue
against the candidate, on paying for the privilege. This pamphlet
is to be mailed by the secretary of state to all voters. Political
parties and independents are permitted to pay for space in a
pamphlet to be issued before election, but the tax is but fifty
dollars per page in this publication. And in certain cities some-
what .similar publications are to be issued, the space costing the
candidate twenty dollars per page.
Now, it must be admitted that however salutary such legis-
lation, this is a very complex law. Many of its features trench
upon personal rights that have long been cherished; and in seek-
ing to regulate elections, the elaborate and paternal supervision
of persons and political organizations will seem to many citizens
extreme and unnecessary, if not unconstitutional. Such a statute
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is not one that presents a concrete proposition to be voted upon,
yes or no, by the people as law makers. It is such, by its very
nature, that opportunity for debate and amendment should be
permitted. Voters may with great unanimity favor the general
principle involved, and may readily support the measure because
of its fair title and its general good design; but this is not enough
to answer the requirement of intelligence and knowledge in the
exercise of the law making power. It is but fair to state, how-
ever, that this measure was before the legislature and failed to
pass, so that there was this reason for submitting it on the
initiative.
To take another illustration:
At the last state election the people voted favorably upon the
adoption of two separate and distinct measures regulating salmon
fishing in the Columbia and Sandy Rivers. It is notorious that
these measures were severally prepared in the interest of business
competitors in fishing and canning salmon on those rivers The
two statutes are utterly at cross purposes, and their adoption
concurrently presents a situation that will require further legis-
lation to untangle. These measures were reasonable enough in
title. So far as the Australian ballot showed they were proper
laws for adoption. But it is probable that few voters read the
bills carefully, or voted understandingly upon them.
At the same election the entire state voted on the creation of
Hood River County, and also on a proposition regulating the
price of meals to prisoners in Multnomah County. These were
purely local concerns, on which few persons not directly inter-
ested could act with judgment.
I call attention to these examples, not for the purpose of pro-
testing against direct legislation in general, but to emphasize the
fact that under the Oregon Constitution as it exists, a new and
grave responsibility has been imposed upon the citizens. As I
have already said, this responsibility calls for the exercise of a
very high degree of intelligence, a personal study of measures
proposed for consideration. That the new duty has not been
well performed in the case of the salmon legislation is apparent,
but the failure in this'instance is not more glaring than the failure
of legislatures to do their duty in other instances. It is fair
to credit the voter with a sincere desire to vote right upon the
questions submitted, and it is evident that in cases where the
question is one of general policy or principle, on which he can
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express himself by a yes or no vote, the best judgment and will
of the majority of the people may be secured. In cases, however,
where the proposed measure consists of many intricate and
involved provisions, the fact that there can be no opportunity of
amendment or any guarantee that the measure will be read or
fully comprehended in all its bearings, points to a danger in this
mode of securing legislation. The danger is not so apparent in
cases where the vote is upon the referendum, for there it is to
be presumed that the measure voted upon has had the benefit of
revision in the legislative assembly, and examination by the gov-
ernor.
In many of the rural districts of the state, where intelligent
interest is manifested in the working of the new scheme of legis-
lation, there will be neighborhood meetings, and debates, and
lectures on the proposed laws; but elsewhere, and especially in
the towns and cities, few will read or meet to discuss such meas-
ures, and the best that can be expected is that some will find in
the newspapers brief statements of the general purp6rt of the
laws to be voted upon.
These reflections suggest the inquiry whether, where the
initiative system is to be used, it should not be confined to cases
in which the law voted on shall be expressive of a single principle
or remedy.
The American people have long been accustomed to vote
upon constitutional amendments; sometimes other measures have
been submitted to popular vote for ratification or adoption. It
will be found that usually in these instances the duty required did
not involve more than an affirmative or negative vote upon a
single question. It is when the duty involves more than this that
the chief danger of the wholesale adoption of ill advised and badly
prepared bills will be encountered.
I am of the opinion that for the reason already stated the
power of the referendum is not open to the criticisms I have men-
tioned, but that it ought not to be made the means of holding
back, and perhaps by the delay making ineffective, measures
adopted by the legislature, unless a much larger percentage of
voters sign the petition than is now required. And I suggest the
question whether, since the real object of the initiative is to enable
the people to make laws where their servants in the legislative
assembly are recreant to duty, it would not be advisable to con-
fine its use to cases where the assembly has refused to pass a bill
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introduced, and where the executive veto has defeated a bill voted
by the legislature.
But my purpose is served by showing that in this new field
there is room for the highest order of statesmanship and patriot-
ism. Timid men, believing that it is not popular to question the
all-sufficiency of this new scheme that has been adopted by such
substantial majority in Oregon will hesitate to undertake the
duty of formulating and urging modifications and restrictions,
But if the initiative is to be upheld as a part of our plan of gov-
ernment, it should be so limited as to insure against worse evils
than those it was designed to correct.
I will not pursue the subject further, but will summarize
what I have said in these propositions:
i. There is a marked tendency in the United States and in
other countries toward enacting sweeping legislation on novel
principles.
2. The evils that apparently give a reason for these changes
are not more serious than have been experienced and dealt with
before.
3. The plan of vesting the law making power in the people
at large is not new in history, and was expressly rejected in favor
of the representative plan by the founders of the United States
Constitution.
4. The recent changes in the Oregon Constitution, and the
facility with which it may now be amended, put new and serious
responsibilities upon the electorate.
5. The initiative system of law making, in the form now
under experiment in Oregon, requires the exercise of an extraor-
dinary degree of intelligence, impartiality, and devotion on the
part of those having the right of suffrage, and is open to certain
criticisms that suggest limitations upon the exercise of the power.
6. These suggestions embody the following changes in the
present plan:
(a) Limitation of the number of constitutional amendments,
and of initiative measures that may be submitted to vote at any
one election.
(b) Limitation of the subject matter of any such measure
to a single proposition, in concrete form.
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(c) Confining the use of the initiative to bills that have been
introduced and failed to pass in the legislature, and those that
have been vetoed by the governor.
(d) Modifying the referendum to require a larger number
of petitioners.
Charles H. Carey.
